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"Property Law: What is it good for? Absolutely Everything."

Inaugural research seminar of Graham Ferris, Reader in Law.

An attempt to identify the potential utility of property law scholarship beyond mere exposition, and a reflection on the multiple uses to which property law can be put both in the academy and in society. From elucidation of the idea of "own", and what we should not own, to the light thrown on legal essentialist thinking (and why it is wrong). In short, a tentative and beguiling beginning to a "pragmatic" account of "property law" that locates value in the purposes and uses our understanding of property law can be put to, rather than in completeness of coverage and the imposition of conceptual tidiness.



1. Dealing with scarcity.

Hart in The Concept of Law (at pp. 196-197​[1]​) lists some form of property law as part of his minimal natural law content for any legal system, and of course Locke posited the protection of property as a crucial impetus for the formation of the social contract. Thus, both authors share a common intuition that we need some means to allocate claims to scarce resources, and that this is a law job that property law accomplishes. Of course this does not necessarily mean adoption of a private property regime for all (or indeed any) scarce resources. Rather, it identifies a key law job (per Llewellyn), as some way of mediating the conflicts generated by scarcity has to be found, otherwise incessant conflicts are likely to lead to the dissolution of the group. 

Property law (contemporary common law of property) is a way of mediating these conflicts that has been quite successful. However, we seldom reflect upon the centrifugal conflicts that property law contains. There is a broad measure of acceptability for property law as a means to allocate resources in contemporary society. Indeed, even the defiant claim of Proudhon that “property is theft” found itself caught up in the self-contradiction of the crime against property being used to attack the actual structure of property distribution and law that obtained – a powerful recognition of the power of property rhetoric to direct feelings of justice and injustice. This rhetorical feature is of course embarrassingly obvious in some of the outpourings of owners of intellectual property, who so painfully want to assimilate their monopolistic claims to resource use to familiar and normatively powerful property law ideas (violation as “piracy” is perhaps too hyperbolic to ever gain popular emotional acceptance).

As the thought experiment of the flute with three claimants demonstrates, when played as a game with a group, the reasons why we accept “property” as a fair and just means to allocate claims to scarce resources are not as widely accepted as the fact that we do.​[2]​ Although one feels abashed at how little analysis and reflection upon the social glue that is property law we have to hand in the academy there is little doubt that it is a primary function of contemporary property law to demarcate claims to resources in a manner that wins acceptance for unequal distributions between members of a society. Furthermore, this function is one that is present in various guises in all stable social systems, and that some social institution or other is performing the law job of property law in each particular case. 

Thus, property law is an effective and generally acceptable way (in modern society) to mediate conflicts over, and allocate claims to, scarce resources. This is a task that property law (or some functionally equivalent institution) carries out in all stable societies. Property law acts as a social collagen.​[3]​


2. Containing complexity, or making good use of reification.

Reification is the treating of some process, or description, or set of circumstances, or concept as a thing. It is to treat as a thing some observed recurring feature of language or the world. Generally speaking reification is a dangerous aspect of our conceptual apparatus – it easily leads to mischief. Perhaps the greatest single practitioner of reification in the Western canon was Plato, who took nouns and adjectives and reified them into universal qualities that had a real existence in a transcendent reality. Plato thought that there was such a thing as truth; and that all chairs partook of the essential quality of chair-ishness (that aspect of them that made them chairs); and that numbers were not symbols but transcendent things, the philosophical contemplation of which brought enlightenment (and the justification for rule over the unenlightened). This constant Platonic urge to reify leads to the imagining of “universals” that have dogged attempts to understand the world for centuries.​[4]​ The identification of “intelligence” as that which intelligence tests measure is a more modern, and frequently pernicious, example of reification.​[5]​ One finds the same trick at work in discourse about the “State”, and the “enemy” of the State: even when “the enemy” is an abstract entity such as “terrorism” it functions in language, and thought, as a thing that seems to exist in the world, though the magic of reification.

Property law is built upon reification, and is an example of how reification might serve useful, or even necessary, ends.​[6]​ In the common law world we do not own dirt when we own land, we own “estates” – an extensive set of rights over a three dimensional area exercisable for a period of time. Property law is the purposeful use of the technique of reification to the governance of the relationships between people and the physical world, and with each other. If we restrict ourselves for the moment to land, then as well as “estates” over land we can have security interests over land (recourse to the estate, or proceeds from the sale of the estate, if obligations are not met); we can have equitable interests in the estate, which may or may not give the right to use of the land; we can have rights of way that give rights to access though, over, or under the land. And for each particular set of claims we imagine a thing, and this thing becomes the subject matter of the claim, a thing that we can deal with by sale, or gift, or exchange, or use as the subject matter of fresh claims which in turn will be treated as things capable of ownership, in just the same way as we imagine the estate as such a thing. 

If we contemplate less tangible “things” than land that can form the subject matter of ownership and property law, such as debts, or copyright, or patents, or government bonds, and shares of publicly traded companies, then the usefulness of reification becomes even clearer. We standardise claims, limit them, and treat the resulting set of claims as a thing that can then be traded, or divided into new sets of claims, that in turn are treated as things. In this process reification enables problems of unmanageable complexity to be reduced to matters that can be understood and thought about purposefully.​[7]​ 

Thus, property law is a conceptual technique that allows us to deal with levels of complexity that would otherwise overwhelm the intellect through the reification of people’s claims to social resources.



3. Facilitating development.

According to Douglass North social institutions, including law, are means by which we try to limit and manage uncertainty.​[8]​ Economic development, which is based upon specialisation of labour, investment in the development of technique, and the use of impersonal markets for obtaining goods and services, is impossible without belief in the regularity of reciprocal social obligations. Property law is a vital part of any imaginable institutional structure that can meet the needs of developmental processes for the reduction of uncertainty.​[9]​ North works at a very high level of abstraction, appendix I givens an account of his theoretical approach and how it might illuminate and be assisted by property law scholars. Today, we will give notice to a couple of influential examples of scholarship pitched at a lower level of abstraction that illustrate the usefulness of property law to development in a more concrete manner.


3.A. Turning a home into an asset.

Hernando De Soto made land law a hot developmental subject with his book The Mystery of Capital. He noted that things, stuff, physical assets, and in particular land, were not without more “capital”. Capital is property that fuels the growth of businesses, or firms in economic speak, and thus, economic development in an economy. Capital is self-renewing and is grown through its deployment. Unlike cake the successful capitalist can have her capital and consume it, as use of capital in profitable activity creates an income stream and renews the original capital. De Soto was concerned with the assertion that developing countries (his primary interest was in Latin America) lacked capital. His thesis was that any such lack of “capital” was not explained by a lack of things, but by a lack of sufficiently accessible property rights.

De Soto observed the use of, the physical investment in and development of, and the defence from antagonistic claims of, land in the informally regulated shanty towns that developed in the environs of cities. Such urban development is often viewed as a social problem, being unlicensed and often lacking an adequate services infrastructure. De Soto saw potential capital in these houses and workshops. Presently the land of the poor was not capable of being utilised as capital because it was not institutionally secure, and transactions were precarious. Existing legal structures were expensive to use, took a long time to access, and were not used. Possessory title was defended through informal means, and was not easily marketable in formal society. It was not the underlying physical world that was a problem, it was the social world of law that was failing to recognise and make more useful the land of the poor. What was needed was a property law that the poor shanty town dweller could access, to secure and formalise de facto possessory title to land.

When property law abstracts the estate from the underlying physical world, and supplies the necessary powers to deal with the estate, it facilitates the multiple uses of the underlying physical assets. Land can be not just a home and workshop that is defended from invasion by physical presence – the limiting case of the de facto title of the shanty town dweller. It can be used to generate an income stream by the hire of possession of the whole or part (a dangerous move in a regime of de facto possessory title). It can be pledged for loans, thereby serving three functions in an impersonal credit market: a means to locate the debtor; an earnest of good faith in the intention to repay; and, finally the source of a remedy for failure to repay, through alienation of the secured property. Conflicts with neighbours can be resolved through cheaper formal means of dispute resolution – formal titles define competing rights, allow for the creation of subsidiary rights such as rights of way or easements of support, and provide a less uncertain way to resolve disputes than the resort to arms. Recognition and elaboration of the title of the shanty town dweller should allow the use of land as more than a physical shelter. 

Reification and the elaboration of rules to govern conflicts over scare resources, in other words property law, promises to generate value and turn people’s homes into capital assets that can give them the means to transcend the poverty of their lives. What De Soto identifies as missing is not things, stuff, aid, or any physical assets. What he thinks is necessary for the generation of capital is simply a system of property law that is accessible to the poor. 

We can briefly link this analysis to that of North. Formal title reduces uncertainty because it is supported by State power, thus making claims of right more reliably enforceable. It allows access to impersonal markets, as it will be recognised by people and organisations from outside the locality of the land, the effective reach of informal title is the neighbourhood. The consequences of making dispositions of the land, in whole or of part, will be more certain as they will be facilitated by the law of property; which will give procedures for dispositions (what are termed formalities) and will provide for powers of alienation. Investment on the land, and business activities on the land, will be encouraged, because the risks of dispossession by private or public force will be reduced.

In short what De Soto pointed out was the economic value of land was not a matter of the physical characteristics of the land, nor of the technological or entrepreneurial capabilities of the controller of the land. Far more important for value are the available social institutions, the property law accessible to the controller of the land. Given property law land can become capital.


3.B. Avoiding the tragedy of the commons.

It was argued forcibly by Hardin that the logic of open access and exhaustible resources is the destruction of the resource and the impoverishment of all.​[10]​ Thus, if twenty people are entitled to graze their sheep upon a common pasture that can renew itself providing 100 or less sheep are grazed then the pasture will be degraded by over-grazing. This is because each of the twenty people will be better off if they graze more than five sheep, although if the other grazers do the same the whole group will lose out. The marginal returns from grazing 6 sheep rather than 5 are positive, because the degradation of the commons caused by overgrazing is spread over not just the 6 sheep of the individual but the 95 sheep of the other grazers. Each grazer gains by overgrazing, and any restraint will be useless if the other grazers act “rationally” and overgraze. The result is a self-interested destruction of the commons, and given the foreseeability of this impending loss of any grazing the incentive to overgraze as much as possible, and maximise the short term returns of the commons, becomes overwhelming. The community of grazers rushes towards its inevitable end, any restraint in the face of onrushing immiseration is immediately to invite exploitation by the other grazers, a sucker’s game. This tragedy of the commons required solution by Government regulation, or the break-up of the commons and its distribution as private property to the grazers, who would have incentives enough to protect their individual plots against overgrazing.

However, Elinor Ostrom observed that in life the tragedy did not always happen, that the self-regulation of the commons was an alternative outcome, and the book in which she collected together accounts of case studies and generated an analytical framework was titled Governing the Commons. It is useful for us to consider this work as it gives some idea of what property law alternatives to separately owned private property might entail. Self-regulation can only be effective if the potential exploiters of the commons can be limited in number – in a genuine public commons open to everyone self regulation is not a possibility. However, Ostrom demonstrates the potentially great robustness of commonly held resources (commons) under self-regulations which may or may not involve the private ownership of extraction rights. Unfortunately, Ostrom was did not analyse the commons of England and North America, the most familiar example of commons to common law property lawyers.​[11]​ 

For self-regulation of a common resource to work several pre-requisites need to be present. As mentioned the number of exploiters must be subject to limitation, and it must be possible for the entitled exploiters to be able to exclude interlopers. The resource must be definable – its extent must be known. Then there are features that will facilitate successful self-regulation. The regulations must be based upon knowledge and understanding of the resource, local knowledge is needed, and this is one reason self-regulation often works well, as the information necessary to create workable rules is likely to be local and often restricted to the exploiters. It must be possible to monitor the obedience of others to the restraints that have been collectively agreed. Contribution and claims should be commensurate, the more you give the more you may take. Punishment for breach of collective rules of restraint should be graduated and responsive to circumstances surrounding the breach. There needs to be a forum for rule negotiation, and a forum for dispute resolution. It is important that rules can be altered to reflect changes in the resource, or the technology of exploitation, or the make-up of the group of exploiters, or changes external to the system such as changes in the price of inputs or products of the resource. The powers outside the community of exploiters need to be at least neutral and preferable supportive of the self-regulation of the resource. Either the total numbers of exploiters are small or the community of exploiters is able to create nested organisational structures (on a fractal pattern, small groups that can be combined into federated larger groups – direct organisation of large numbers seems to be very fragile if not unachievable). 

Self-regulation is capable of generating many specific regimes. It can support merely restraint, or also co-operation in the supply of labour or other resources applied to sustaining the resource. Such co-operative aspects of the situation feel almost like “public law” rather than the more familiar private law of property. However, the rights of exploitation seem more like familiar property claims. Such rights can be expressed in various forms – the subject matter of exploitative rights can be quite varied. Thus, they may be to a time during which exploitation is allowed (for example a time during which water can be drawn from an irrigation channel, or a period of time during which a naturally occurring crop may be harvested), or an the right might be to an amount of extraction measured by time or quantity (a quantity of water that can be drawn from an irrigation channel in five minutes, or enough fodder to maintain a limited number of livestock can be taken), or a right to a place of exploitation on a rota basis (the right to the best fishing spot). Indeed, these user rights are sometimes reified as objects that can be traded as private property (for example the right to draw water from the irrigation system, or the right to a net which gives a place in a rota of fishing rights), although the people permitted to acquire such rights may well be restricted.

The earlier reflection on the law job of property law, the mediation of access to scarce resources, helps us to understand these relatively unfamiliar institutions as property law institutions. For some resources a commons based property solution (in which the rights of exploiters, the rights of the commoners under the old common law system of commons, are the private rights asserted over the collectively held commons) is the superior solution. Relatively poor quality land that would need large areas to be subject to private ownership to be useful; land with many small micro-climates that gains its utility from the ability to shift livestock around a large geographical area; irrigation projects that require either co-operation in restraint, or substantial collective effort in maintenance or management; are examples of resources that are well suited to collective use. 

In terms of uncertainty management the governance of common resources is a classic example of the way in which action to deal with one uncertainty can give rise to other uncertainties centred in the possible strategic actions of other members of the social group. Thus, to deal with the physical uncertainties of rainfall it is possible for a community to collect rain, and water, in a reservoir for release in controlled amounts over the growing season. However, this leads to uncertainty about the control of the release of the collective resource. Those located towards the head of the reservoir may treacherously overuse the resource that is so temptingly close. Or some group may try to seize control of the resource to extract a rent from the rest of the community. In overcoming the physical uncertainties a new source of uncertainty has been created, and if that cannot be overcome then the maintenance and efficient use of the resource will be impossible. The “property law” solution is to facilitate the negotiation of rules that the community of water users can agree to implement and monitor. If allowed to act in isolated self-interest the problem of free-riders (those who take but do not contribute) will soon overwhelm the system. The valuable private claims to access to the scarce resource are only sustainable through institutions that allow for the communication between and supervision of each by the other. The new uncertainties created by the collective action to secure a collective resource need fresh institutional work if they are not to destroy the development effort. And the best situated people to carry out the task of institutional design and implementation are the community of exploiters themselves. One reason they are best suited is information costs, they know the resource and temptations of abuse best, and when conditions change they will be the first to become aware of the new uncertainties and the need to respond.

In short, Ostrom reminds us of the potential variation in property law responses to scarcity problems. Her self-regulating communities tend to create norms of behaviour around the collective resource, and their locally produced rules are of course the sort of “custom” the common law traditionally recognised and legitimised as law.


3.C Facilitating development – conclusion

There is much more that could be said about the economic role of property law as a facilitator or impediment to economic development. We have not touched on reducing transaction costs through standardisation and enhancing certainty through reliable norms and practices of enforcement. Nor have we touched upon role of intellectual property in widening public knowledge of technological advances, and the securing of research and development investment in the face of what might otherwise be insuperable free-rider problems. 

However, one feature of both De Soto’s and Ostrom’s work is the need for a responsive property law regime. It is not just the rules and mechanisms of enforcement that are of importance, indeed given the brute fact of change any particular rule will eventually become less than optimal. What was always important, and remains so, is the mechanisms by which the law is allowed to change. It has been the ability of the common law legal system to allow property law to develop through mechanisms of “percolation” (by which I intend from the “bottom” upwards rather than from the top down as in the model of public legislation) that has been the genius of the common law in the past, and that remains a crucial challenge for all legal systems in the future. 

After all uncertainty means we do not yet know what the problems are no matter the solutions. In such circumstances a robust system of feedback and experiment is likely to pay premiums in the long run.



4. The education of a law student

Property law is sometimes seen as a problem in legal education, as it is a notoriously technical subject that is difficult to apprehend as a whole – students struggle to see the point of it. My final topic will be the possible ways in which property law can deliver educational benefits within a law curriculum.

Traditionally we divide property law into land law, the law of trusts, and intellectual property law. This division is not coherent as land and intellectual property are divisions by subject matter, the nature of the things the law is concerned with, whilst the law or trusts, or trusts and equity is a division not based on subject matter but jurisdiction – indeed, trust law is an integrative feature of the law of property as it applies in similar fashion to all types of subject matter. The division also tends to lead to the neglect of the law of personal property, although with respect to chattels (also known as goods, or choses in possession) the law of personal property is often partially covered in courses devoted to commercial law, which goes some way to meeting the practical deficiencies of the division. Thus, the division is not justifiable on practical or intellectual terms. Nor is it justifiable on doctrinal terms post-1925 [!], as the integration of the law of property has been a doctrinal principle of English law since the passage of the 1925 property legislation, although it is a principle that educational and business practice has never fully accepted. This paper accepts the traditional division, as it is clearly institutionally well rooted, and is unlikely to be overturned whilst the current regime of core subjects for a qualifying law degree subsists.

The potential educational benefits that flow from the teaching of property law are divided below into formal, substantive, thematic, and practical. Hopefully the classifications will be self explanatory in the light of the content.


4.A. Formal benefits of an education in property law

There is no reliable means to divide the contestants in many property law disputes into the good and the bad. The classic property law dilemma involves two innocent parties, who have been pitched into conflict by the actions of a third party who is not available to give an adequate remedy. This means the courts cannot impose a solution based upon relative fault. The normative instinct to locate who is most to blame and award against them is frustrated. Where the innocent must suffer there are two possible approaches to seeking a just solution. The first is to split the difference, allow each of the innocent some part of the remedy sought, to move towards a distributive justice based upon a sense of fairness (arguably the law has reached this stage in terms of some property disputes, in particular those concerned with the ownership rights in the family home of unmarried claimants, see Stack v Dowden). This is not generally acceptable, as the court is being asked to decide between two contradictory claims to ownership of some property asset. It is hard to see why an imposed division of the asset is not the partial expropriation of the owner, in order to compensate the losses of the other claimant, whose remedy should lie not against the owner but against the third party. Therefore, the court is forced to adopt the other available approach, to decide the dispute according to the logic of the legal concepts engaged.

Property law is logically determined to a remarkably extent for such an essentially practical pursuit as law. The common law has grown in piecemeal fashion by logical development of previous decisions, because there has been no stronger current to shape its development. The respect given to the law of property (which has been constitutionally important, and socially attractive to the political nation) by judiciary and legislature has been congruent with this high regard for legal concepts. Whether by principle, policy, or prejudice is immaterial, the law of property has developed a very logically coherent body of doctrine to deal with the reified objects of ownership. The propriety of respecting the legal consequences that follow from the law of property is almost unquestionable in modern discourse.  Indeed, it is rare for anyone to question the obvious existence in nature of such entities as the fee-simple estate in land with all its incidences. There is even a human right that demands respect for the same abstractions of our law. The important issue for legal education is the rigour of analysis that this approach has led to in property law.

Thus, we have a highly artificial subject (property law) which operates through repeated reification to produce conceptual objects which are then subject to rule bound dealings. Property law repays study as it often is determined by the logic of its own conceptual structures. Nowhere else in the law is the need for consistency and due form given more respect. 

To give a single example, consider the mad logic of the unilateral termination of a periodic joint tenancy.​[12]​ To preserve a fifteenth century fiction; specifically, that periodic tenancies are for a fixed period, although one has no idea when they will end at the commencement of the tenancy; it is necessary to insist that a periodic tenancy comes to an end at the termination of each period. Thus, for a monthly tenancy at the end of each month it is terminated unless the parties renew it by … doing nothing. Thus, doing nothing [physically] is the positive act [legally] of continuing the tenancy. From which it follows that not doing nothing [physically] may not be an act, but inaction [legally]. Not doing nothing [physically], in other words doing something, must constitute not renewing the tenancy if it is possible not to renew. Obviously, the law would be hopeless if any act constituted a failure to renew, and there is one specific formality that the law looks for, as it shows the intention not to renew clearly. In order to not continue the tenancy it is necessary to serve a notice, but this is not a positive act of destruction [legally] – this is in effect notice of the intention not to act [legally], not to renew - to passively leave the tenancy to automatically end. Thus, when expressly not renewing by notice one is legally inactive when physically active in serving the notice. 

The problem is all derived from the judicial decision to treat inaction [physically] as a positive action [legally], in order to overcome a technical problem in the law of leases centuries ago. Now, today, if one’s rents a council house jointly then one’s joint tenant is able to destroy the tenancy by serving a unilateral notice to quit the tenancy. This is not a wrong, as it is not an action. But it will lead to the automatic termination of the tenancy, the right to live in the house, and the right to buy (which may be worth thousands of pounds). That is logic being given its head, and that is our law. 

Hopefully this brings home the potential importance of consistency across time and circumstances, and the danger of a decision having unpredicted effects due to the force of felt need for consistency. For students tracing the impact of a proposition of law across years and different social contexts is salutary. The logic of the unilateral notice to quit is unobjectionable as logic. If it is felt to be wrong then it must be in the consequences of the conceptual schema that any wrongness resides, and that brings us face to face with the awful truth that good reasoning may be necessary but not sufficient in law. 

There are educational benefits here. In the careful use of words that is necessary to explain the law. In the attention one needs to give to the structure of arguments. In the possibility of discovering a wholly unpredicted effect, that arises from a proposition advanced to achieve a sensible purpose being applied in circumstances unconsidered at the time of the initial use of the proposition. In appreciation of the fact that the task of the judge and the jurist is not merely to be correct in reasoning, but also to be sensitive to the consequences of one’s logic. 

In truth one cannot cram many such lessons into a curriculum. However, the law of property provides numerous opportunities to explore the nature of conceptual reasoning applied to human conduct across many contexts. Property law repays study, because the demands of logic and consistency are taken seriously in the desire to be fair because the result is determined by the concepts. To be fair because it is the logic of the law that produces the winner and the loser, not the favour of the judge or the politician. This object of ownership is mine because it is mine, as that question has been determined by the laws of my country. Reflection tells us that the nature of the object, and of the ownership, and the consequence of a successful claim that it is mine, are all determinable by the same law. A glimpse of this obvious and startling truth would be a powerfully educative experience of what mere formal analysis can illuminate.


4.B. Substantive benefits of an education in property law


Property law has a large static corpus (institutions), but is primarily concerned with dynamic problems (transactions). Thus, it can illustrate interesting problems of general interest to a legal scholar or lawyer.

This can be shown using the law governing the creation of trusts, as black letter and traditional a topic as any. The law in this area is under constant tension between the need for certainty and the impulse to give effect to the intention of property owners. There are several reasons why this tension is probably irresolvable. However, a central strain is the possible perverse consequences of seeking to work more perfect justice in the case under consideration upon other potential litigants and upon the conduct of future potential litigants. This type of systemic tension is not rare in the law, and the creation of the gratuitous trust gives students an opportunity to contemplate the problem in a well known, thoroughly analysed, and relatively 
straight-forward circumstances.

Thus, if the court stands ready to hear long and detailed evidence on the intention of the property owner who has not complied with formality requirements then it may be able to give effect to that person’s intentions more perfectly. However, this will have two predictable and undesirable consequences. 

First, it will make available an easy threat to a discontented and frustrated potential object of a property owner’s generosity. If a non-executed disposition might be effected by the court on the basis of oral and circumstantial evidence then the threat of a challenge to launch litigation to this end cannot be easily dismissed. Insistence upon the observance of formalities secures property owners from such threats, as they reduce the issues that can realistically be raised. If we ignore allegations of fraud or extreme misconduct we are left with: was the formality complied with? As formalities typically leave clear physical evidence of compliance there is little chance of threats of speculative litigation being taken seriously (or indeed launched). Thus, the desire to give effect to the frustrated intentions of one property owner undermines the security of the estates of all other property owners.

Second, it will weaken the incentives to property owners to make their dispositions effective by compliance with formalities. It is tempting to put off legal matters, and if the courts will ensure that any formal tasks uncompleted can be perfected without the owner being needed this temptation increases. Certainly in joint acquisition of property the reliability of the courts in imposing the necessary property structures upon the transactions of parties has enabled people to avoid the formal requirements altogether (thus s. 53(1)(b) Law of Property Act 1925 has not been effective in forcing co-owners to declare the terms of their relationship, see: Tinsley v Milligan). 

Here lies the rub. Individualised justice in one case may lead to the use of legal threats and an increase in uncertainty that will cause distress in many other cases. The substantive educative point is that the law, and the judges, must consider the unintended but foreseeable consequences of actions taken with the best of intentions. Law will be used, acted upon, and relied upon by people who will not be before the court, or in the forefront of a legislator’s mind. Given the needs for consistency in law, especially property law, it is necessary to proceed with great care, and may even be proper to deny an unfortunate litigant a remedy to preserve the claims and safety of many other potential future litigants.


4.C. Thematic benefits of an education in property law 

Problems of scarcity inevitably raise issues of justice, a virtue that has two aspects, regularity and impartiality of process and the rightness of distributional decisions. If we should reward some actions and penalise others then we recognise desert, which is a principle of justice. If we recognise the claim of the helpless and lame to aid then we recognise claims for recognition of need as a criteria for goods, and we recognise a principle of justice. Property law is in part founded upon principles of justice. Multifarious and inconsistent claims to property are recognised by our property law, and can supply one source of a thematic aim for property law teaching.

The courts have faced such issues in an acute form in the context of family homes. To be brief on a subject that will be very familiar to those engaged in teaching property law. 

There are disputes between third parties who have given consideration in good faith and co-owners whose interests have been hidden (William & Glyns Bank v Boland), or whose consent to attach those interests has been obtained through misconduct (Barclays Bank v O’Brien; CIBC v Pitt) or whose interests have been rightfully encumbered but whose vulnerability calls forth the protective jurisdiction of the courts (Cheltenham and Gloucester Building Society v Norgan). All of these types of cases raise justice issues as well as technical issues.

There are disputes between those who have clear claims formally recorded and those whose claims rest in contribution, agreement, or reliance in good faith. Although Stack v Dowden can stand in for a multiplicity of cases the problems caused in this jurisdiction have been long standing and have illuminated even issues our courts would generally refuse to countenance as too theoretical for judicial consideration (National and Provincial Bank v Ainsworth).

Finally, the doctrinally obscure, but surely present, interaction between the burgeoning discretionary jurisdiction in the field of divorce on the traditionally rule bound and circumscribed jurisdiction of the courts in property law begs to be unpicked and reflected upon.

There is an overabundance of potential materials here that could be used to give a thematic purpose to the delivery of property law. And yet we have not even touched upon that universal solvent of legal relations and property law specifically that goes by the name of proprietary estoppel.


4.D. The practical benefits of an education in property law


If one wishes to understand and advise on a contract concerning the sale of goods, either domestic or international, one needs to grasp the property law aspects of the matter.
If one wishes to preserve an effective claim for payment of a client who extends credit to a company that may become insolvent, then one needs an awareness and understanding of the law of property, and specifically formal and informal security devices.

If one wishes to advise a client on the provision they make for their family upon death then one needs knowledge of the law of property.

If one wishes to analyse typical banking transactions, especially loans to business, then one needs a firm grasp of those aspects of the law of property that relate to real security.

Indeed, there are few areas of legal or business practice that property law does not intrude upon ….

And, of course, there is conveyancing as well.



5. Conclusion

Although I have no doubt tried your patience I have not succeeded in doing more than scratching the surface of what property law is good for. I have not dealt with those very important limits we put upon property law (no treating of people, or people’s body parts, as property); nor with the role property law has played in the constitutional history of England, and its rather different importance in the constitutional history of the USA; nor with the importance of cheap and secure laws for the transfer of property in the modern economy. However, if I have convinced you that the property law is not a pinched and merely technical subject of study then I have succeeded in my aim in this paper. If not then the fault is no doubt mine, as it really is a surprisingly interesting and indeed intriguing subject, if one can get beyond the rather dour face it tends to present to the world.
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“(iv) Limited resources. It is a merely contingent fact that human beings need food, clothes, and shelter; that these do not exist at hand in limitless abundance; but are scarce, have to be grown or won from nature, or have to be constructed by human toil. These facts alone make indispensible some minimal form of property (though not necessarily individual property), and the distinctive kind of rule which requires respect for it. The simplest forms of property are to be seen in rules excluding persons generally other than the ‘owner’ from entry on, or the use of land, or from taking or using material things. If crops are to grow, land must be secure from indiscriminate entry, and food must, in the intervals between its growth or capture and consumption, be secure from being taken by others. At all times and places life itself depends on these minimal forbearances. Again, in this respect the human organism might have been constructed like plants, capable of extracting food from air, or what it needs might have grown without cultivation in limitless abundance.	The rules which we have so far discussed are static rules, in the sense that the obligations they impose and the incidence of these obligations are not variable by individuals. But the division of labour, which all but the smallest groups must develop to obtain adequate supplies, brings with it the need for rules which are dynamic in the sense that they enable individuals to create obligations and to vary their incidence. Among these are rules enabling men to transfer, exchange, or sell their products; for these transactions involve the capacity to alter the incidence of those initial rights and obligations which define the simplest form of property. The same inescapable division of labour, and perennial need for co-operation, are also factors which make other forms of dynamic or obligation rules necessary in social life. These secure the recognition of promises as a source of obligation. By this device individuals are enabled by words, spoken or written, to make themselves liable to blame or punishment for failure to act in certain stipulated ways. Where altruism is not unlimited, a standing procedure providing for such self-binding operations is required in order to create a minimum form of confidence in the future behaviour of others, and to ensure the predictability necessary for co-operation. This is most obviously needed where what is to be exchanged or jointly planned are mutual services, or wherever goods which are to be exchanged or sold are not simultaneously or immediately available.”The passage shows up Hart’s strengths and weaknesses well. It is broad and cosmopolitan in its outlook, and yet it manages to push contemporary Western solutions to the forefront of contemplation, thus, reflection informs us that status is an equally obvious means to solve some of the co-ordination problems Hart is identifying. It is seemingly positioned outside of any particular viewpoint (it is contingent that we cannot photosynthesise) and yet is clearly heavily influenced by presuppositions about social production practices (“simplest forms of property … entry on, or use of land” - which rather supposes sedentary agricultural production, and strongly suggests individual rather than collective cultivation as a model). It seems to be based on a consideration of what must be the case as a matter of necessity given the contingent facts of existence and yet is clearly meant to be based on observation of actual societies in some, rather obscure, way. What he clearly does do is open up interesting lines of inquiry for anyone who is interested n the role of property law at a high level of abstraction or generality, as opposed to the specific property law in operation in a single time and space.
^2	  The allocation of the flute thought experiment, or when presented to an audience perhaps more fittingly “game”, is one that I and my colleague Rebecca Huxley-Binns have carried out on several occasions now. Our initial source for the game was Amartya Sen’s book The Idea of Justice. Our experience has been that justifications based on the intuition that John Locke had, that labour somehow creates a just claim to its product, are most popular in the twenty-first century UK. The game involves three claimants to an unallocated flute: one who made it, one who can play it, and one who has no other assets at all.
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^6	  The best treatments of property law as the elaboration of a strategy of reification, although it does not use such terms, are: Lawson The Rational Strength of English Law, and Lawson and Rudden The Law of Property (the second and third editions are sufficiently different to count as different books for this purpose). The analysis of legal rights into component parts by Hohfeld was clearly inspired by the need to de-reify property, and the corporation, in order to identify the real choices open to the courts and law. Legal reification is often accompanied by crude assertion of essentialism, that can be less than useful to clarity of thought, it was to combat such essentialist thinking that Hohfeld broke the reified objects of property ownership and corporation law into their contingent and complex constituents.
^7	  It seems our short term memory can only manage around seven pieces of information at any time, and therefore our ability to think about complex problems depends very much upon our ability to code information (coding multiple pieces of information as a single piece). I take this idea from Jerome S Brunner Going Beyond the Information Given in In Search of Pedagogy Volume 1who takes it from GA Miller The Magic Number 7 + 2. Viewed in this perspective reification is coding complex information as a single piece of information, as a thing.
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^9	  See the quote at n. I for Hart’s intuitive and incoherently articulated intuition in this regard.
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